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Agriculture is facing stringent requirements for nutrient loss reductions. These reductions should be done 
cost-effectively. For instance, the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) emphasizes cost-effective-
ness in reaching good water status in European river basins by 2015. River Basin Management Plans 
specify the eventual reduction targets, which will differ between the basins. These differences have implica-
tions on cost-effectiveness assessments: changing the level of total abatement changes the relative shares of 
measures in the cost-effective allocation. In this paper we develop a model which determines the cost-ef-
fective allocation of three alternative measures to reduce phosphorus loss from ﬁelds. The model allows for 
comparisons with cost and reductions of all possible allocations. We show that, even for homogenous re-
gions, the cost-effective allocation of measures is strongly dependent on the target level, and that using the 
allocation from one reduction level as a guideline for other levels violates cost-effectiveness seriously. On 
the grounds of these results we give recommendations for cost-effectiveness assessments in the context of 
the WFD. 
Key words: cost-effectiveness, phosphorus abatement, buffer strips, wetlands, fertilizer use, Water Frame-
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Introduction
Agri-environmental policy is typically driven by 
political target setting. For instance the Helsinki 
Convention requires a 50% reduction of nutrient 
loads to the Baltic Sea (HELCOM 1994). This af-
fects Finnish water protection targets until 2005 
with the goal of reducing the anthropogenic phos-
phorus load by 45%, and nitrogen by 40%, from 
the levels of the early 90s (Vesiensuojelun tavoit-
teet vuoteen 2005). Pressure is increasing to re-
duce agricultural phosphorus runoff, its contribu-
tion  to  anthropogenic  phosphorus  levels  being 
60% (Finland’s Natural Resources and the Envi-
ronment 2002).
Finland’s  program  for  the  protection  of  the 
Baltic Sea from the year 2002 calls for 20 000 hec-
tares of wetlands and 40 000 hectares of buffer 
strips to be established. Together with agreements 278
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for reduced use of fertilizers, controllable drainage 
systems and organic farming this should reduce 
loadings by about 40% in total phosphorus and ni-
trogen  levels  (Suomen  Itämeren  suojeluohjelma 
2002).
The  European  Water  Framework  Directive 
(WFD) takes a different approach towards setting 
targets. It requires River Basin Management Plans 
to identify basin speciﬁc targets, baseline scenari-
os, gaps and schemes of measures. Even though 
the national goals and programs remain in effect, 
WFD differentiates regions with respect to reduc-
tion targets. Thus the eventual targets will be set 
on the basis of the needs of single basins only, and 
can hence be different even between fairly similar 
basins.
The  importance  of  achieving  environmental 
targets  cost-effectively  is  commonly  acknowl-
edged. This requires identifying the effects of po-
tential measures and the associated costs. There 
are signiﬁcant differences in assessing efﬁciency 
nationwide compared to operations of a smaller 
scale. Simple calculations can show that heteroge-
neous agricultural regions have different cost-ef-
fective solutions to reach the same target (see e.g. 
Sharpley and Rekolainen 1997). Nationwide plan-
ning loses efﬁciency due to this heterogeneity of 
areas. More diversiﬁed planning, like that induced 
by WFD, avoids this problem to some extent. The 
question remains though, will there be major dif-
ferences  in  cost-effective  allocations,  even  be-
tween homogeneous regions, with different target 
levels?
Analysing efﬁciency of agricultural environ-
mental policy is complicated. Ambient water qual-
ity is not directly linked to pollution loads from a 
basin. The observability of nutrient losses is limit-
ed and also impedes the creation of the right incen-
tives  for  the  economic  agents  (Segerson  1988, 
Fleming and Adams 1997). Uncertainty can be re-
duced by increasing spatial information on emis-
sions  (Xepapadeas  1995).  Beneﬁts  gained  from 
this are tempered by the costs incurred in gathering 
more information (Helfand and House 1995).
Assessing costs and effects of agricultural nu-
trient abatement is difﬁcult. It requires simultane-
ous use of biological and economic models or data. 
Vatn et al. (1999) provide a framework for inter-
disciplinary modelling, and an application for as-
sessing  cost-effectiveness  of  different  strategies 
for reducing nitrogen and phosphorus losses. Their 
application uses deterministic and stochastic phys-
ical submodels to predict the physical and eco-
nomic  consequences  of  chosen  actions.  Their 
model, however, is primarily meant for analysing 
various policy scenarios, not for ﬁnding the cost-
effective combinations of policies.
Studies speciﬁc to the cost-effectiveness of ag-
ricultural nutrient reductions in the Baltic basin 
include, for instance, Byström (2000) on cost-ef-
fectiveness with or without the use of wetlands, 
Ollikainen and Honkatukia (2001) and Gren (2001) 
on cost-effectiveness with or without international 
coordination.  Eloffson  (1997)  builds  a  spatial 
model of agricultural nitrogen reduction for the 
whole basin. She estimates cost functions of elev-
en measures to reduce nitrogen and presents cost-
effective solutions for different target levels.
Hart and Brady (2002) examine the issue of 
different target types in their study on efﬁciency of 
agricultural policies in reducing pollution of the 
Baltic Sea. Their focus is on regulator’s optimal 
responses to three alternative ways of setting the 
target: the three variables being emissions, nutrient 
stock and ecosystem quality. Their approach in-
cludes various measures, with a focus on choice of 
crop, management practices, and the levels of fer-
tilizer use. The efﬁcient abatement solutions are 
combinations of these. They ﬁnd that optimal strat-
egy is strongly dependent on both the types and the 
levels of targets.
Brady (2003) introduces regional aspects and 
agricultural policy into a nitrogen abatement mod-
el. He deﬁnes a least-cost solution based on present 
levels of agricultural subsidies as second best and 
compares it with a least-cost solution based on the 
situation where subsidies are decoupled from pro-
duction. The optimal solutions differed substan-
tially in land use allocations, abatement intensity 
and total costs of abatement. Both Brady (2003) 
and Hart and Brady (2002) used mathematical pro-
gramming models.
What has not been analysed, however, is how 
robust cost-effectiveness of an abatement alloca-279
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tion is inside one region, or between identical re-
gions, with varying target levels. That is, how se-
verely does application of abatement measures in 
uniform  ratios  affect  the  cost-effectiveness  of 
abatement, given variation in abatement targets?
We use the River Basin approach of WFD to 
illustrate the idea. Suppose we have two (almost) 
identical basins, whose nutrient loads enter differ-
ent waterbodies, and that these waterbodies differ 
in  their  sensitivity  towards  external  phosphorus 
load. Further suppose that the baseline scenarios 
suggest that neither of the waterbodies reaches a 
good status by the year 2015, and therefore sup-
plementary measures1 have to be introduced. Due 
to differences in their sensitivity towards phospho-
rus load, we can assume that the River Basin Plans 
(RBP) of the two basins will eventually set differ-
ent  targets  on  phosphorus  abatement.  WFD  re-
quires  that  cost-effectiveness  of  supplementary 
measures has to be assessed in RBPs.
To save money there might exist an incentive 
to generalize abatement plans. How much can the 
one basin beneﬁt from cost-effectiveness assess-
ments conducted for the other basin? Are there any 
dangers entailed in making the assessment for one 
basin and then adapting the same cost-effective 
scheme of measures to the other basin, but on a 
different scale? Can efﬁciency be violated? This 
paper aims at answering these questions.
In the present study we quantify the importance 
of correctly setting the target levels for nonpoint 
source phosphorus abatement. We consider a sin-
gle type of phosphorus abatement target, that is set 
at different levels. We solve the cost-effective al-
locations of measures and analyse how the efﬁ-
ciency is affected when we use the allocations on a 
smaller scale. For this purpose we develop a static 
nonlinear mathematical programming model that 
generates cost-effective solutions for various tar-
get levels inside a region. The model is applied 
here to Yläne River Basin, in Southwest Finland, 
and  considers  3  measures:  reducing  the  use  of 
phosphorus fertiliser (hereafter: P-fertiliser), creat-
ing buffer strips and creating wetlands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Firstly we present the analytical model, secondly 
we introduce the numerical model and apply it to 
Yläne River Basin, thirdly we present the results, 
and ﬁnally, we discuss the results.
The analytical model
Cost-effectiveness  equalizes  marginal  abatement 
costs from all sources of pollution for any target 
level (e.g. Baumol and Oates 1988). We can use 
this general result to illustrate the central idea of 
the paper. Measures to prevent and reduce agricul-
tural nutrient loads vary, in terms of initial costs, 
effectiveness etc, resulting in nonidentical abate-
ment and marginal abatement functions for differ-
ent measures.
Figure 1 presents three arbitrarily chosen cur-
vatures  of  marginal  abatement  cost  functions2. 
Readers can think of these as: marginal abatement 
costs for wetlands, MCw; fertilizer reductions for 
an  unspeciﬁed  crop,  MCP;  and  construction  of 
buffer strips, MCs.
In the graph we have depicted allocations of 
abatement measures that satisfy two different pol-
lution constraints: high ( ‘’ ) and low ( ‘ ). The hori-
zontal axis denotes the level of abatement of each 
measure, under the two constraints. The vertical 
axis denotes the marginal abatement cost, and the 
shadow price associated with the pollution con-
straints. In the cost-effective solution for the higher 
pollution  constraint  the  buffer  strips  reduce  the 
pollution by s’’ ,wetlands by w’’, and fertilizer re-
duction by P’’. The overall level of abatement is a 
sum of these if we assume that measures are inde-
pendent. The shadow cost of the constraint is λ’’.
The contribution of measures towards abate-
ment differs radically between the two constraints. 
1  By supplementary measures we mean the abatement 
measures used on top of the measures included in the base-
line scenario.
2  The curvatures are chosen for illustrative purposes 
and thus do not represent the results of this paper.280
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For instance, cost-efﬁciency requires that for the 
lower pollution constraint we use no wetlands, and 
the buffer strips become the most important con-
tributor to overall reduction. Hence using the con-
tribution  ratios  of  the  higher  constraint  for  the 
lower constraint would not yield a lowest cost al-
location of abatement and vice versa. Our aim is to 
analyse how severely the conditions of cost-effec-
tiveness are violated by linearly scaling cost-effec-
tive measure allocations for various levels of agri-
cultural phosphorus abatement.
In our model we link costs due to both changes 
in  agricultural  production  and  introduction  of 
phosphorus  abatement  measures,  with  their  re-
spective changes in phosphorus loss. We consider 
a single region which can be viewed as a repre-
sentative farm. The quality of soil varies within the 
region and the land is allocated to different crops 
on the basis of these differences. This allocation is 
assumed to be ﬁxed and we assume that a certain 
crop is always allocated to a certain soil type3. In 
addition to crop distribution, soil quality distribu-
tion mainly determines the phosphorus loss (here-
after  referred  to  as  P-loss).  Social  planner  can 
combine three measures to reduce P-loss: phos-
phorus application levels4 for various crops, buffer 
strip width and the size of a representative wet-
land. The abatement combination has to satisfy an 
exogenous constraint on total P-loss with the low-
est possible cost.
We deﬁne the loss of total phosphorus from the 
region as:
 
E =  
n
∑
i=1
 e(θi, Pi, w, s) ,  (1)
where:
θ: a phosphorus status parameter for soil type   
i = 1…n 
Pi: phosphorus application to a crop allocated 
to soil i = 1…n
w: area of wetlands (or a representative wet-
land) 
s: width of buffer strip. 
Thus the total P-loss from the region is the sum 
of P-losses from all the region’s soil types. The pa-
rameter  θ  captures  two  relevant  aspects  of  soil 
quality: the crop yield potential and the P-loss po-
tential. The representative wetland (w) is common 
for the whole region, and the buffer strips (s) of 
even width are constructed on locations suitable 
for  them,  independent  of  crop  distribution. The 
model is thus very simple: it does not allow for 
crop rotation or targeting the buffer strips accord-
ing to crop use. The abatement measures affect the 
3  This is a restrictive assumption. Several studies have 
shown that the crop allocation depends also strongly on 
economic variables: input and output prices, subsidies etc. 
(see  e.g.  Lichtenberg  2002,  Lankoski  and  Ollikainen 
2003). However, in view of our research questions, this 
assumption can be made without loss of generality. 
MCs
MCP
�
’
’
�
’
MCw
Marginal abatement cost 
                                                                     P
’   s
’      s
’’      w
’’    P
’’
                                       Abatement 
Fig. 1. Uniqueness of cost-effec-
tive  abatement  allocations  of 
three measures, at two different 
levels  of  total  abatement.  The 
curves MCw , MCP and MCs de-
pict  illustrative  marginal  abate-
ment cost curves for three differ-
ent measures. λ depicts the shad-
ow  cost  of  pollution  constraint. 
Total abatement is the sum of in-
dividual  abatement  contribu-
tions.
4   For illustration, we considered fertilizer reductions in 
Figure 1. From now on, we consider fertilizer application 
levels which, together with initial levels, deﬁne the fertil-
izer reductions as well.281
A G R I C U L T U R A L  A N D  F O O D  S C I E N C E
Vol. 14 (2005): 277–292.
average loss from the whole region, not individual 
losses  separately.  These  simpliﬁcations  can  be 
done without compromising too much information 
relevant to our research questions. Obviously our 
assumptions make the exact values of abatement 
costs less precise. The effects of varying the scale 
of abatement, however, can be analysed with our 
model.
The costs include the opportunity cost of land 
at  different  levels  of  phosphorus  fertilizer  use, 
equal  to  net  proﬁt;  and  both  establishment  and 
maintenance costs of buffer strips and wetlands. 
The  cost  of  an  allocation  {P, w, s}  under  P-loss 
constraint, E ≤ ˜ E is 
C =  
n
∑
i=1
[π (θi, P i
*, w*, s*) – π (θi, P i, w, s)],  (2)
where P*, w* and s* denote the optimal choices of 
fertilizer input, acreage of wetland and buffer strip 
width in the absence of a constraint on P-loss. The 
cost is thus a sum of differences in proﬁts over all 
soil types, i.e. between the private optimum and 
the allocation satisfying the pollution constraint. 
The proﬁt from a soil type i with fertilizer use i is 
deﬁned as:
πi = (1 – w – s)[f (θi, Pi) pi – tiPi] – CC(w, s),  (3)
where pi is the price of output of the respective 
crop, ti is the price of input (P-fertilizer), and CC 
the initial, operational and maintenance costs of 
wetlands and buffer strips5. The detailed CC func-
tion is presented with the application. The total 
acreage of land is scaled to 1, hence the opportu-
nity cost of wetlands and buffer strips is captured 
in (1–w–s), where (w+s) = [0,1].
The abatement cost is obtained by combining 
the cost of abatement, C, with the respective re-
duction in P-loss.
We make the following assumptions about cost 
functions:
∂C /∂w and ∂C /∂s > 0, and ∂C /∂Pi < 0 for all i 
∂² C /∂w∂w and ∂² C /∂s∂s = 0,  
and ∂² C /∂Pi ∂Pi > 0 for all i.
Thus the costs of constructing acreage unit of a 
buffer strip or wetland are linear and increasing, 
and the cost function for fertilizer reduction is in-
creasing and convex. 
For the loss and abatement functions we as-
sume:
∂E/∂w and ∂E/∂s < 0,
∂²E/∂w∂w and ∂²E/∂s∂s > 0
∂E/∂Pi > 0 for all i 
∂2E/∂Pi∂Pi > 0 for all i.
Thus we assume P-loss to be decreasing and 
convex with respect to wetlands and buffer strips 
and increasing and convex with respect to fertilizer 
use. 
The problem of the social planner is to select 
the cost-effective combination of wetlands, buffer 
strips and P-fertiliser subject to the constraint on 
P-loss. Formally, we have6:
  
ma
w,s,P x – C (θ, w, s, P) 
(4)
s.t.E (θ, w, s, P) = ˜ E
Our assumptions guarantee interior solutions. 
Solving a Lagrangian equation from (4) yields the 
ﬁrst order conditions, which can be expressed as: 
λ =  ∂C /∂w
  ∂E /∂w 
(5a)
λ =  ∂C /∂s
  ∂E /∂s 
(5b)
λ =  ∂C /∂Pi
  ∂E /∂Pi 
, for all i = 1…n  (5c)
E (θ, w, s, P) = ˜ E  (5d)
Conditions (5a–5c) require that the efforts of 
each abatement measure are increased up to the 
point where marginal abatement costs (marginal 
costs relative to marginal reduction) are equal for 
all  abatement  measures.  Finally,  condition  (5d) 
guarantees that the overall reduction target is met. 
The shadow cost of the P-loss constraint is equal to 
λ, which is increasing in target reduction.
5  The CC function has only w and s as its arguments 
since the opportunity cost is entirely captured in the ﬁrst 
term of RHS. 
6  Now, for notational simplicity, θ and P are vectors, as 
in 5d.282
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We can solve (4) with a mathematical program-
ming model. In the following, we present this nu-
merical model, and apply it to a case study.
Numerical model and its  
application to the Yläne Basin
A key assumption in our model is that abatement 
costs are additively separable and abatement meas-
ures are independent7. Hence, the effect on abate-
ment of a buffer strip (wetlands) is presumed not 
to depend on the level of fertilizer use or the con-
struction of wetlands (buffer strips). To justify this 
assumption, note that buffer strips and wetlands 
reduce mainly particulate phosphorus from runoff. 
Even though not explicitly modeled in the present 
study, the effects of changes in P-fertilizer use on 
P-loss take place via long run changes in soil phos-
phorus level. The loss of particulate phosphorus in 
runoff is quite insensitive to short term changes in 
fertilizer use (Ekholm et al. 2005)8. The combined 
effects of wetlands and buffer strips are not ana-
lysed in our model. If they both affect the same 
runoff, the interdependencies are obvious. We will 
discuss later the possible implications of taking 
these into account.
We apply the model using actual data from a 
sub-basin of the Yläne Basin, Southwest Finland. 
The  calibrations  and  simpliﬁcations  in  the  case 
study are based on land use allocations used by 
Palva et al. (2001) and crop use allocations from 
data provided by the ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, reported in Iho (2004). These are present-
ed shortly at the end of the respective sections.
The crop yield function
In Finland the short and intensive growing season 
and strong binding of phosphorus into soil makes 
fertilizing a long term project. The phosphorous 
uptake  occurs  mainly  from  the  plant-available 
phosphorus fraction of the soil phosphorus. The 
purpose of fertilizing is predominately to maintain 
this fraction (e.g. Saarela and Saarela 1999, Saare-
la et al. 2003). To incorporate the long term char-
acter of fertiliser use into a static model, we postu-
late the production function as follows.
In our case study we assume θ to be captured in 
the soil test phosphorus (STP). The crop allocation 
is made according to this and by looking at the ac-
tual allocation we can ﬁnd justiﬁcations for as-
sumptions on values of θ. In the Yläne Basin over 
90% of farm land is allocated to grain and grass, 
and approximately 2% to potatoes. Less than 1% is 
allocated to sugar beet, 5% to oilseeds, and 2% to 
peas.
We incorporate these features in our model by 
assuming that all the soil has either high or low θ, 
and potatoes are allocated to high θ soils, barley to 
low θ soils. The allocation to barley is assumed to 
be 95%. In this way, we incorporate the differences 
in soil quality in the model, while keeping it as 
simple as possible. We set the high θ to correspond 
to a STP value of 25 and the low θ to 13.4. To-
gether with the chosen soil quality allocation, the 
average STP value will be the same as the actual 
values in the Yläne Basin as reported in Palva et al. 
(2001).
The crop yield function f is constructed of two 
components9. The ﬁrst one, F, is sensitive to the 
7  For more detailed technical description of the model, 
see Iho (2004).
8  One can think that in this model fertiliser reductions 
affect the leaching of (dissolved) phosphorus by slowly 
altering soil phosphorus status, whereas buffer strips and 
wetlands affect mainly the particulate phosphorus in the 
runoff. Explicit modeling would require dynamic analy-
sis.
9  Dividing crop yield function into two components 
where one is constant enables static modeling of growth in 
response to P-fertiliser. The same approach has been used 
by for instance Myyrä and Pietola (2005). In our model, 
the correct level of crop yield is of importance in deﬁning 
the opportunity cost of land. The marginal effect of phos-
phorus fertilising (based on long term ﬁeld experiments by 
Saarela et al. 1995 and 2003) deﬁnes the marginal costs of 
phosphorus reduction, which in turn deﬁnes the marginal 
abatement costs.283
A G R I C U L T U R A L  A N D  F O O D  S C I E N C E
Vol. 14 (2005): 277–292.
use of P-fertilizer, and the second, A, is constant 
for each crop. 
fi =Fi + Ai ,  (6)
where i is either potatoes or barley.
For the ﬁrst component, we choose the yield 
response function of Saarela et al. (1995)10 :
Fi = yeciPi (–0.132Pi + 12.4) +  
  (24 – 0.367θi)√ Pi + 6.97,  (7)
where θ (=STP) = soil phosphorus, ye = experi-
mental  year  and  c  =  crop  parameter.  The  only 
choice variable in (7) is P. The crop parameters c 
are 2 for potato and 1.05 for barely (Saarela et al. 
1995) and the experimental year is ﬁxed to 6 (the 
experimental periods of Saarela et al. (1995) were, 
on average, about 12 years each).
In equation (2) we deﬁne costs as differences 
between privately optimal allocations and alloca-
tions satisfying the P-loss constraint. In the appli-
cation, we use fertilising levels adopted from Palva 
et al. (2001) as optimal levels, and the reductions 
are conducted from these at 1 kilogram per hectare 
intervals. These levels are set at 15 kg ha-1 for bar-
ley and 45 kg ha-1 for potatoes, and will be later 
referred to as the original levels of fertilizing11.
The constant component of the crop yield func-
tion is determined by (7), and by actual crop yield 
data for the Yläne region, i.e. the left-hand side of 
equation (6): 
Ai = fi
* – F(Pi
*, θi , ye , ci),  (8)
where f * is the average crop yield 1994–1999 and 
P* is the respective fertilizer level, as reported in 
Palva et al. (2001). Since (8) is determined by a 
ﬁxed level of fertilisation, it is constant for both 
crops. With these levels, assumed STP values, and 
the crop yield levels reported in Palva et al (2001) 
we ﬁnd the constant crop yield for potato to be 
21,513 kg ha-1 and for barley 3,728 kg ha-1.
We assume that the average price is € 0.114 kg-1 
for potato and € 0.125 kg-1 for barley12. For pota-
toes the price of fertilizer is € 0.46 kg-1 (P-ratio 
3:31), and for barley € 0.32 kg-1 (P-ratio of 2:29).
P-loss and abatement functions
Among factors contributing to P-loss from agricul-
tural land are: the level of easily soluble P in the 
soil,  the  type  of  fertilizer  used,  the  methods  of 
spreading, the soil type, the slope of the ﬁeld, the 
crop used, and rainfall as en exogenous factor etc. 
(Sharpley 1995, Pote et al. 1996, Ylivainio 2002, 
Palva et al. 2001, Ekholm 1998). Our model di-
rectly includes only fertilizer use as a choice vari-
able. The phosphorus status is accommodated in-
directly as most of the P-loss is determined by θ.
The phosphorus used for fertilising affects the 
P-loss  mainly  by  steering  the  dynamics  of  soil 
phosphorus (McDowell and Sharpley 2001, Yli-
Halla et al. 2002, Ekholm 2005). Given the exog-
enous variables, rainfall in particular, most of the 
loss occurs on the basis of soil properties that are 
constant in the short run. We can capture this again 
by separating the P-loss into a constant share, and 
a share that varies according to fertiliser use. The 
soils with high θ have higher constant values for 
P-loss than soils with low θ. For the application, 
we assume that 5% of loss is determined by P-fer-
10 The yield function having only phosphorus use as a 
choice  variable  is  unsatisfactory:  P-fertiliser  is  usually 
given in a ﬁxed proportion with other nutrients. We ignore 
the cost of these by taking into the fertilizer cost only the 
proportion of P in the fertilizer mix.
11 This assumption has weaknesses: the original level is 
inﬂuenced by subsidies. Also the rates are based on re-
ported levels, and are thus subject to errors, both intended 
and unintended. But even though this affects the order of 
magnitude, the inﬂuence on our research question is not 
substantial. Under our assumptions, and with our model 
that does not account for the use of other inputs, the pri-
vately optimal fertilizer levels would be 39 kg ha-1 for bar-
ley and 51 kg ha-1 for potatoes.
12 We assume that, on average, due to differences in 
eventual crop quality, 75% of the crop yield of both crops 
is  sold  at  a  higher  price  (€ 0.14  kg-1  for  potatoes  and 
€ 0.131 kg-1 for barley) and 25% at a lower price (€ 0.034 
kg-1 and € 0.108 kg-1). An individual farmer does not know 
how large a fraction of his/her crop yield can eventually be 
sold at a higher price.284
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tilizer use, 95% by the constant term at the original 
level of fertilisation.
Following an unpublished work by Granlund 
et al., we assume the P-loss from land growing 
barley to be 1.11 kg ha-1 a-1. We calibrate the actual 
reported total P-loss by Kuusela and Savola (2000) 
to match the loss induced by our assumed land-use 
allocations, and hence assume the P-loss from land 
growing potato to be 3.33 kg ha-1 a-1. Further, the 
contribution of fertilizer use at the original level is 
assumed to be 5% of the total P-loss13. With these 
assumptions the constants of P-loss are 1.04 kg ha-
1 a-1 and 3.16 kg ha-1 a-1. Making such a signiﬁcant 
assumption  about  the  P-loss  coefﬁcient  is  done 
mainly to enable us to conduct the analysis with 
two crops that are different in terms of their crop 
yield and P-loss characteristics.
Buffer strips
Buffer strips are used at ﬁeld edges susceptible to 
erosion. We create a coefﬁcient, s, which denotes 
the fraction of cultivated land suitable for buffer 
strips. Another coefﬁcient, k, tells how much more 
intense the runoff is from these parts of the ﬁeld.
The buffer strip’s phosphorus abatement as a 
function of strip width takes the form:
rb(m) = 1 – ((sk) / (sk + (1 – s)))* mα,   (9)
where m is the width of the strip in hundreds of 
meters. The ratio [0,1], given by the dependent 
variable, rb, is of the share of P-loss not removed 
by the strip. Equation (9) is based on the results of 
Uusi-Kämppä and Kilpinen (2000) and assump-
tions on the characteristics of buffer strip abate-
ment14. According to Uusi-Kämppä and Kilpinen 
(2000) a buffer strip of 10 meters width removes 
30–40% of the total phosphorus (TP) surface run-
off. Approximately,  an  equal  amount  is  lost  in 
drainage, where the buffer strips have no effect 
(Uusi-Kämppä and Kilpinen 2000). Thus we as-
sume that a 10m wide buffer strip removes 17.5% 
of the TP runoff originating from the ﬁeld. We also 
assume concavity of the abatement function with 
diminishing marginal abatement. We hence cali-
brate α to be 0.76.
Based on buffer strip plans for the region we 
assumed that the ﬁeld acreage from which the run-
off can be reduced by buffer strips is 25% of the 
total ﬁeld acreage15, hence s is attributed the value 
0.25. The runoff is assumed to be three times high-
er from those parts of the ﬁeld considered suitable 
for buffer strips; hence the parameter k = 3. For the 
sensitivity analysis we vary, among other things, 
both the above mentioned values.
Wetlands
We postulate the abatement function for wetlands 
from the phosphorus reduction function of Puus-
tinen et al. (2001):
W(r) = 13.1r + 0.01,  (10)
where r is the effective size of the wetland, divided 
by the acreage of the wetland catchment and W de-
notes TP reduction as a percentage. Obviously, a 
linear function has its weaknesses: after the rela-
tive size of 7.6% all the phosphorus is removed.
We constrain (10) by assuming the maximum 
TP abatement to be 75%, in line with Reinhardt et 
al. (2005). We further assume this reduction to be 
achieved with the relative size of 10% and a loga-
rithmic abatement function. By ﬁtting these with 
the original values from Puustinen we have:
13 The 5% share is the only part of the P-loss that can be 
reduced by fertilizer use reductions. 
14 We use buffer strip width as a choice variable. The 
function is postulated from Uusi-Kämppä and Kilpinen 
(2000), and is not presented elsewhere as such. For in-
stance Vought et al. (1994) estimate abatement functions 
with width as a choice variable. We know, however, that 
the range of reported buffer strip abatement functions in 
various studies is very large, and all available functions   
are hence very uncertain (Dosskey 2002). Therefore the 
tailored buffer strip abatement function based on Uusi-
Kämppä and Kilpinen (2000) was considered suitable for 
our purposes.
15 Anni Karhunen. 1.7.2003. A written note.285
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w(r) = 25.1ln r + 20.4,   (11)
which is a concave function.
As with buffer strips we assume that the acre-
age of wetland bound runoff is smaller than the 
whole ﬁeld area. So the ratio of P-loss not removed 
by a wetland is:
rw(r) = 
1 – [ss*(25.1ln r + 20.4) + (1 – ss)] /100,  (12)
where ss denotes the fraction of the ﬁeld acreage 
through  which  the  runoff  ﬂows  to  the  potential 
wetland16. We assume this to be 0.15, and later 
analyse the implications of the choice.
Initial, operation and maintenance 
cost function 
All cost functions are implicitly deﬁned by equa-
tion (2) as reductions in proﬁt due to abatement 
decisions. We now deﬁne the explicit costs of con-
structing a wetland or a buffer strip in equation (3). 
Costs of fertilizer reduction are entirely captured 
in equation (2) and the production function (6).
The control cost function for buffer strips and 
constructed wetlands consist of initial costs (di-
vided by the duration), yearly operation and main-
tenance costs and the opportunity cost of land. The 
function is:
CC(w,s) = w (1458 + 59) + s (9 + 25),   (13)
where the ﬁrst term of each sum is the initial cost 
per hectare divided by 15 years, and the second 
term  is  the  annual  operations  and  maintenance 
cost.17 The costs of wetlands is adopted from Puus-
tinen et al. (2001) and of buffer strips from Maata-
louden ympäristöohjelma 1995–1999:n taloudelli-
nen analyysi (1999), and Maa- ja metsätalousmi-
nisteriö (2002).
Results
We ﬁrst solved the model for seven different con-
straint levels, to see how the cost-effective combi-
nation of measures evolved in response to chang-
ing constraint. This way we were able to highlight 
how  the  relative  abatement  contribution  ratios18 
change with total abatement. These features are 
presented in Figure 2.
We then analyse how the conditions for cost-
effectiveness are violated if we use the cost-effec-
tive abatement contribution ratios of higher total 
abatement for lower total abatement levels. This is 
presented in Figure 3.
In general, the results indicated that the aver-
age unit cost of abatement was rising as the reduc-
tion target tightened, and hence the marginal abate-
ment costs were rising, as predicted. The results 
also showed that the cost-effective allocations for 
all but the lowest total abatement level were com-
binations of all three measures, hence all measures 
were  used  after  a  certain  level.  The  absolute 
amounts of abatement of all measures were rising 
up to 35% total abatement, i.e. as the target level 
rose, all measures were used more intensively. The 
relative  shares  on  total  abatement,  however, 
changed substantially along the way.
16 Using the acreage as a choice variable is dubious. For 
instance Reinhardt et al. (2005) state that the most impor-
tant factor affecting phosphorus retention in wetlands is 
the minimum water residence time: most of the phospho-
rus loss occurs during few high discharge events and the 
average  retention  capacity  is  not  important  (see  also 
Sharpley and Rekolainen 1997). On the other hand, it is 
the relative size of a wetland that determines indirectly the 
water residence time. Better modeling of wetland reten-
tion would yield more realistic results.
17 We do not discount costs, which naturally affects the 
values of cost functions. In sensitivity analysis we, how-
ever, varied the weights of abatement contributions and 
noticed that this has no signiﬁcant effect on scale issues 
even though it has on optimal allocations. 
18 By abatement contribution ratio we mean the ratio of 
individual abatement measures on total abatement. For in-
stance if wetlands would contribute to abatement of 5 kg, 
buffer strips to 3 kg, and fertiliser reductions to 7 kg of 
phosphorus, the total abatement would be 15 kg, and the 
abatement contribution ratio would be 5:3:7.286
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Figure 2 presents the relative abatement contri-
bution ratios of the measures for seven different 
total abatement levels. The ratios (see footnote 15 
for deﬁnition) illustrate how the relative share of 
each measure in total abatement develops as the 
target level changes. 
From Figure 2, the relative contributions of in-
dividual measures differ substantially under differ-
ent reduction targets. Wetlands contribute to a sig-
niﬁcantly larger part of total abatement under low 
levels of abatement, whereas buffer strips contrib-
ute  more  heavily  with  higher  target  levels. The 
contribution to abatement of reducing fertilizer use 
is zero for the lowest target level and also remains 
relatively low at higher levels19. Recall that Figure 
2 does not depict the values of absolute abatement 
of the measures. The change in relative contribu-
tions thus originates from differences in (marginal) 
abatement cost functions, similar to our illustrative 
example in Figure 1.
We see that all abatement contribution ratios 
are unique. More precisely, cost-effective abate-
ment contribution ratios sustain cost-effectiveness 
only at their own total abatement levels. In the fol-
lowing, we will try to quantify this feature.
In Figure 3 we illustrate differences in average 
unit costs of abatement, due to using contribution 
ratios of higher total abatement for a 10% reduc-
tion. The examination is constructed as follows. 
The baseline unit cost is that of cost-effective 10% 
abatement on TP. We compare this with unit costs 
of six alternative measure allocations, each result-
ing in the same, 10% abatement. The ﬁrst alterna-
tive allocation uses the abatement contribution ra-
tio of 15% cost-effective abatement, and scales all 
measures  evenly  downwards  to  sustain  a  10% 
abatement. The difference in the unit costs is de-
picted on the vertical axis. The next allocation uses 
20% cost-effective abatement, maintains the con-
tribution ratio to reduce 10%, and compares the 
unit costs. This is done until 39% abatement. In 
Figure 3 we thus do not compare unit costs of ris-
ing total abatement – all allocations yield the same 
total abatement. 
relative contribution
of measures
10  15  20  25  30  35  39
Total abatement level, %
P on barley P on potato buffer strip wetland
Fig.  2.  The  relative  abatement 
contributions of each measure on 
different  cost-effective  total 
abatement  levels.  For  instance 
the ﬁrst bar shows that wetland 
contributes to a 10% total abate-
ment by approximately 85% and 
buffer strips by 15%.
19 If we had considered the theoretical private optimum 
as the initial level of fertilizer use (see footnote 8), the 
contribution  of  fertilizer  reduction  on  total  abatement 
would have been strictly positive from the ﬁrst units of 
reduction. In the private optimum, the marginal cost of fer-
tilizer equalizes its marginal beneﬁt, hence, the marginal 
cost of fertilizer use reduction at that point is zero. Instead, 
we start with fertilizer levels that are already below the 
private optimum.287
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From the graph we see that the difference in 
unit costs rises surprisingly rapidly. For instance, 
the average unit cost of reducing 10% of the phos-
phorus  load,  with  a  measure  contribution  ratio 
taken from 30% cost-effective abatement, is € 66 
kg-1, 35% higher than the unit cost of cost-effec-
tive 10% abatement (€ 49 kg-1).
Again, it is important to note that the rising 
graph in Figure 3 does not represent rising unit 
costs of higher abatement levels. All points in the 
graph  contribute  towards  approximately  10% 
abatement20.  Unit  costs  do  naturally  rise  with 
abatement levels, but much faster than in the graph 
(for instance, the average unit cost of 30% reduc-
tion is € 120 kg-1). The graph thus shows that it is 
very costly to apply abatement contribution ratios 
that are cost-effective at a unique level of total 
abatement, to any other total abatement level.
Sensitivity analysis
For the sensitivity analysis we varied input and 
output prices, land allocation changes, parameter 
values  for  crop  yield  and  P-loss  functions,  and 
phosphorus abatement cost functions for wetlands 
and buffer strips (i.e. the parameters of initial, op-
erations  and  maintenance  cost,  abatement  and 
yield functions). We tried to ﬁnd variations that 
would affect the relative abatement contribution 
ratios, and cost structure of measures. Some of the 
surprisingly rapid rising unit cost differences (see 
Figure 3) could be explained by the fact that the 
abatement  contribution  of  wetlands  is  relatively 
high. Our model assumes a single wetland for the 
whole basin, with only its size as a choice variable. 
It provides speciﬁcally effective abatement at the 
lowest levels of total abatement, even though its 
initial costs are high. To see whether we observe 
similar unit cost differences with a smaller abate-
ment role for wetlands, we consider a situation 
where the ratio of wetland abatement is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller at all levels of total abatement.
Simultaneously  weakening  the  phosphorus 
abatement of the wetland, and increasing the con-
tribution  of  fertilizer  application  to  the  P-loss 
caused a shift in phosphorus abatement from high 
initial  cost  wetlands  towards  lower  initial  costs 
(fertiliser reductions and the use of buffer strips). 
Recall that the maximum contribution of this years 
fertilizing on P-loss was originally set at 5%. We 
increased this to 10% and lowered the maximum 
phosphorus abatement of wetlands to 50% (origi-
nally 75%)21. This would presumably change the 
cost-effective abatement contribution ratios, but to 
what extent?
The same basic results still hold: the cost-ef-
fective solutions were combinations of all mea-
sures, the intensity of all measures rose as the tar-
get tightened, and the cost-effective contribution 
ratios are unique for all levels of total abatement. 
Additional 
unit cost, € kg-1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
10  15  20  25  30  35  40 
The rate of abatement the contribution ratio is adopted, %
Fig. 3. The additional unit cost for a 10% total abatement, 
executed with different contribution ratios. The horizontal 
axis denotes the level of total abatement from which the 
contribution  ratio  is  adopted. The  vertical  axis  denotes 
how much higher the unit costs of 10% total abatement are 
than under the cost-effective ratio for a 10% reduction. 
The unit cost of a cost-effective 10% reduction is € 49 
kg-1. All points thus refer to a 10% total abatement.
20 In Figure 2 the comparison was done for different to-
tal abatement levels.
21 Lowering the maximum abatement affects the whole 
range of wetland abatement cost function. The new func-
tion  is  also  logarithmic  and  approaches  the  maximum 
abatement level smoothly.288
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We examine the relative shares in a same manner 
as we did earlier in Figure 2. Figure 4 depicts the 
abatement contribution ratios in the new situation.
We see that the relative contributions of mea-
sures towards phosphorus abatement change from 
the original situation. We also see that the unique-
ness of abatement contribution ratios remains. This 
consolidates  the  feature  that  contribution  ratios 
can be cost-effective only at a unique level of total 
abatement.
Presumably  however,  there  are  quantitative 
changes due to greater use of measures with lower 
initial costs. These changes are presented in Figure 
5, which depicts the unit cost difference in a simi-
lar fashion to that of Figure 3. 
In this case the cost-effective 10% phosphorus 
abatement has an average unit cost of € 71 kg-1. 
Applying the cost-effective ratio obtained for 30% 
phosphorus abatement to a 10% reduction target, 
raises the unit cost (of 10% abatement) by € 24 
kg-1, more than 30%. Hence, even though the nu-
meric values are different, the percentage varia-
tions seem to be very small.
An interesting question is the importance of 
the direction of scaling, i.e. whether we use the 
contribution ratio from a high total abatement lev-
el, and apply it to lower levels or vice versa. Since 
the cost-effective contribution ratios are unique for 
each total abatement level, there are costs incurred 
from scaling up as well. In our model, however, 
relative contribution
of measures
10  15  20 25  30  35 
Total abatement level, % 
P on barley P on potato buffer strip wetland
Fig.  4.  The  relative  abatement 
contributions  of  each  measure 
when  parameters  of  abatement 
cost  functions  are  varied.  The 
variations have changed the rela-
tive weights of measures, but not 
the effect of changing contribu-
tion  ratios  along  with  the  total 
abatement level.
Additional 
unit cost, € kg-1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
10  15  20  25  30  35  40 
The rate of abatement the contribution ratio is adopted, %
Fig. 5. The additional unit cost for a 10% total abatement 
with the respective parameter variation as in Figure 4. On 
vertical axis, note the different scale from Figure 3. The 
unit cost of a cost-effective 10% reduction is now € 71 
kg-1.289
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the  abatement  measure  used  most  for  the  10% 
abatement (wetlands) has a maximum abatement 
capacity of 75%. Scaling up would then mean sub-
stantial costs without respective increase in abate-
ment, since we would have to increase the size of 
a wetland and incur costs, without gaining any in-
crease in total abatement. In the context of WFD, 
however, scaling up might be an equally relevant 
issue.
In our paper the costs of measures were not 
discounted, an important consideration affecting 
the viability of measures with high initial costs 
(wetlands) compared to those with low initial costs 
(buffer strips and fertilizer reduction). The analy-
sis above, however, suggests that changes in rela-
tive favourability of measures would not affect the 
general results of this study, namely the adverse 
effects from making linear transformations of pol-
icy  recommendations  obtained  from  nonlinear 
models.
Discussion
This paper shows that there is a potential caveat to 
policy recommendations on the basis of cost-ef-
fectiveness analysis. If we ﬁx the ratio of abate-
ment measures to a level that is cost-effective at a 
particular total abatement level, and then apply the 
ratio to other levels. The constraint, and hence the 
target level of abatement, strongly affects the rela-
tive favourability of abatement measures. This can 
render supposedly optimal policies inefﬁcient if 
the target levels differ, even for identical regions. 
In short, cost-effective ratios of abatement meas-
ures do not retain their cost-effectiveness under 
any other constraint.
This result has policy relevance when fulﬁlling 
the requirements of the European Water Frame-
work  Directive. The  eventual  nutrient  reduction 
targets,  based  on  baseline  scenarios  and  water 
quality requirements, will be unique for each ba-
sin. Hence the cost-effectiveness of supplementary 
measures has to be assessed on an individual basin 
level, even if there are comparable basins conduct-
ing  cost-effectiveness  analysis.  This  should  be 
taken into account when coordinating research of 
the implementation of the directive.
Single basins will have only limited sets of po-
tential  measures  to  reduce  agricultural  nutrient 
loads.  Hence,  in  their  cost-effectiveness  assess-
ments,  they  shall  not  provide  general  nutrient 
abatement cost functions that cover a large range 
of constraints. Most probably, their analysis will 
consist of few alternative measures, from which 
they choose the lowest cost combination. These 
kinds of plans will not be cost-effective for other 
basins, targeting at different levels of abatement. 
This result is further complicated if other basins 
have to reduce, say nitrogen instead of phospho-
rus, or a combination of both.
However,  beyond  the  implications  to  policy 
makers, the ﬁndings of our paper also raise ques-
tions  regarding  the  direction  of  future  research. 
For instance, what role could national and interna-
tional research play? In the view of this paper, one 
of the most central areas would be provision of ac-
curate nutrient abatement cost functions for a large 
range of abatement levels. With the help of these 
the  individual  river  basins  could,  knowing  the 
available  abatement  measures  and  their  current 
utilization, plan efﬁcient schemes to reach the ba-
sin speciﬁc environmental targets. For instance, an 
example of this kind of reporting is found in Hart 
and Brady (2002).
The measures could also be simply ranked with 
respect to the desired phosphorus (nitrogen) abate-
ment level, so that they could be applied gradually 
while maintaining the cost-effectiveness along the 
abatement path. In its simplest form, this would 
provide an order of application which the basins 
can follow as they tighten their environmental tar-
gets.
Our results suggest that the economic instru-
ments for agri-environmental policy might have to 
be strongly diversiﬁed in order to sustain different 
policies for different basins. The possibilities and 
costs of diversifying the instruments should be ad-
dressed in further studies. Uniform agri-environ-
mental policy is the alternative to diversiﬁcation. 
Our paper quantiﬁes the costs of one problem re-
lated  to  uniform  policies.  Uniform  incentives 290
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throughout identical basins cause similar actions 
by economic agents. Even though the incentives 
were designed to yield cost-effective abatement al-
locations in an average basin, the differences in 
target levels cause inefﬁciencies. This holds thus 
in  a  deterministic  world  with  identical  basins. 
There  are  already  many  studies  on  diversifying 
economic instruments, but to our knowledge, not 
in the context of the WFD. The basin wide ap-
proach of WFD, and its strong emphasis on cost-
effectiveness, face severe difﬁculties if there are 
only  uniform  agri-environmental  instruments 
available.
And ﬁnally, other research issues not covered 
in our paper whose absence was highlighted dur-
ing its completion include: the effects of combin-
ing different measures with respect to partly coun-
ter-effective  results  in  phosphorus  and  nitrogen 
reduction;  the  issue  of  the  different  phosphorus 
forms’ varying effect on eutrophication22. In con-
clusion, our paper highlights the potentially haz-
ardous  shortcomings  in  inadequately  modelling 
cost-effective  policies,  which  may  even  reverse 
their  cost-effectiveness.  These  shortcomings  are 
deserving of further research and would provide, 
not only a basis for efﬁcient policy making within 
the WFD’s current requirements, but will also pro-
vide an invaluable basis for any future calculations 
of cost-effective abatement measures.
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SELOSTUS
Maatalouden ravinnekuormituksen vähentämisen kustannustehokkuus
Antti Iho
Helsingin yliopisto
Maatalouden  ravinnekuormituksen  vähentämiseen  on 
suuria paineita, ja vähennyksiltä edellytetään usein kus-
tannustehokkuutta. Esimerkiksi EU:n vesipuitedirektiivi 
edellyttää kustannustehokkuustarkastelua niiltä ylimää-
räisiltä toimenpiteiltä, joita ympäristöllisiin tavoitteisiin 
pääseminen vuoteen 2015 mennessä edellyttää. Vesien-
suojelualueille asetettavat mahdolliset vähennystavoit-
teet saattavat poiketa toisistaan merkittävästi. Tämä vai-
kuttaa  kustannustehokkuusanalyysien  soveltuvuuteen 
eri alueiden välillä. Tässä tutkimuksessa pyritään esitte-
lemään ja kvantiﬁoimaan näitä vaikutuksia. Ratkaisem-
me  kustannustehokkaan  suojeluratkaisun  kolmen  eri 
vesiensuojelumenetelmän kesken fosforin vähennyksen 
eri  tavoitetasoille,  ja  vertailemme  suojeluratkaisujen 
kustannustehokkuutta  eri  mittakaavassa  toteutettuna. 
Osoitamme, että jopa homogeenisten alueiden kustan-
nustehokkaat  suojeluratkaisut  riippuvat  voimakkaasti 
vähennysten kokonaistasosta. Näin ollen eri alueet eivät 
voi suojelussaan toteuttaa kustannustehokkuutta sovel-
tamalla  toisten,  vaikkakin  samankaltaisten,  alueiden 
kustannustehokkaita  suojeluratkaisuja  omalle  alueel-
leen, mikäli vähennystavoitteet eroavat toisistaan. Tu-
losten perusteella otamme kantaa kustannustehokkuus-
analyysin käyttöön vesipuitedirektiivin yhteydessä. 